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JURISDICTION 
This is a trust deed foreclosure action in which plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion for partial 
summary judgment was granted and a judgment and decree of 
foreclosure were entered on May 11, 1989. (R. 582-588.) The 
Tanner defendants1 filed their notice of appeal on May 19, 1989. 
(R. 626-628.) In response to the Tanner defendants1 oral motion 
lHTanner defendants" in this brief shall refer to Appel-
lants, Darrell D. Tanner, Jason Tanner, Tracy A. Tanner 
McDonald, Linley A. Tanner, Bradley H. Tanner, Darrell D. Tanner 
as trustee of the Tanner family trust, and the Ridge Athletic 
Club, Inc. 
for a determination of finality under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 552), the Order granting the motion 
for summary judgment expressly provided that the judgment was 
final and appealable. (R. 581.) This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. When a statutory amendment extinguishes the trustor's 
right to cure any default before a decree of foreclosure is 
entered, does the amendment apply retroactively to trustors in 
default who guaranteed a trust deed before the amendment? 
2. Does an "after-acquired property" provision in a 
security agreement operate to grant a security interest in 
personal property placed on the premises by a person who 
guaranteed performance of the security agreement (with respect 
to the initial collateral) but did sign any security agreement 
with respect to the after-acquired property? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A copy of the pre-amendment statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-31 (1983, amended 1985) is reproduced in Appendix "A," 
and a copy of the post-amendment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-
31 (1988), is reproduced as Appendix "B." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action to judicially foreclose a deed of trust. 
2 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On December 10, 1987, plaintiff filed its Complaint to 
judicially foreclose a deed of trust on real property situated 
in Utah County. (R. 1-45.) The Tanner defendants filed an 
Answer on January 5, 1988. (R. 81-83.) On June 27, 1988, the 
Osmond defendants2 filed a Cross-Claim for indemnity and breach 
of contract against Darrell Tanner. (R. 260-283.) 
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on November 
21, 1988. (R. 308-09) The Tanner defendants responded on 
December 19, 1988, and also filed their own motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 374-75.) Plaintiff subsequently amended its 
motion to omit any claims against defendant Holladay Bank & 
Trust. (R. 477-479.) On March 31, 1989, oral arguments on the 
motions for summary judgment were heard before the Hon. Ray M. 
Harding of the Fourth District Court. 
On May 11, 1989, the district court entered a Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure. (R. 582-588.) An Order of Sale was 
issued on May 12, 1989. (R. 589-594.) The Tanner defendants 
filed a Notice of Appeal on May 19, 1989. (R. 626-628.) On May 
22, 1989, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued to enjoin the 
2lf0smond defendants11 refer to the Osmond Brothers Invest-
ment Trust, a Utah partnership, George V. Osmond, individually 
and as Trustee of the Osmond Brother Investment Trust; Olive 
Davis Osmond, individually and as Trustee of the Osmond Brothers 
Investment Trust; Allan R. Osmond and Suzanna P. Osmond, 
individuals; Merrill D. Osmond and Mary C. Osmond, individuals; 
M. Wayne Osmond and Kathryn L. Osmond, individuals; Donald C. 
Osmond and Debra A. Osmond, individuals; Jay W. Osmond, an 
individual;and Olive Marie Osmond, an individual. 
3 
execution of the Order of Sale pending this appeal. (R. 629-
630.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On or about December 24, 1979, Sherwood Associates executed 
a Trust Deed Note ("Note") in favor of Bettilyon Mortgage Loan 
Company ("Bettilyon") in the principal sum of $1,200,000.00. To 
secure payment of the Note, Sherwood Associates executed in 
favor of Bettilyon a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
("Trust Deed") dated December 24, 1979, with respect to real 
property located in Utah County and now commonly known as the 
Ridge Athletic Club. (Appendix "C") Payment of the Note was 
guaranteed by the Osmond defendants. (R. 10, 90.) Washington 
National Insurance Company ("Washington National"), is the 
successor in interest of Bettilyon. (R. 8.) 
Darrell Tanner purchased the property on December 24, 1982 
(R. 261, 265-73, 296), and on January 10, 1983, executed a 
guaranty of the obligations evidenced by the Note and Trust 
Deed. (R. 33-32.) The property was operated by Ridge Athletic 
Club, Inc. (Deposition of Darrell D. Tanner, p. 12 lines 21-
23.) There is no dispute that the defendants1 interests3 in the 
property are subordinate to that of the Plaintiff. (R. 82 and 
377.) 
3Many of the defendants did not claim any interest in the 
property, and no monetary relief was sought against those 
defendants. The Tanner defendants against whom no monetary 
relief was sought, and who never at any time claimed any 
interest in the real property, are Jason Tanner, Tracy A. Tanner 
McDonald, Linley A. Tanner, and Bradley H. Tanner. 
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By letter dated November 30, 1987, Washington National 
declared that the Note was in default and purported to declare 
all sums due and owing under the Note to be immediately due and 
payable, and demanded payment in full by December 7, 1987. (A 
copy of the letter appears in Appendix "D") Ridge Athletic 
Club, through Darrell Tanner, its president, responded by 
tendering payment of the entire delinquency due under the Note. 
(A copy of the Tender appears in Appendix "E.") Darrell Tanner 
had the ability on that date to cause Ridge Athletic Club, Inc., 
to pay the full amount tendered. (R. 382.) Plaintiff objected 
to the Tender on the grounds that the entire unpaid balance was 
due and owing (not just the delinquency) and that Plaintiff 
doubted the Defendant's ability to pay the Tender. (A copy of 
this letter, dated December 8, 1987, is attached as Appendix 
"F.") 
Plaintiff filed its complaint, seeking judicial foreclosure 
of the trust deed, on December 10, 1987. On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court found the issues in favor of 
plaintiff. A final judgment for the Plaintiffs was entered on 
May 11, 1989, which gave rise to this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the Tanner Defendants guaranteed the Note in 1983, 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 granted debtors the right to cure a 
default "at any time prior to the entry of the decree of 
foreclosure" if the beneficiary chose to foreclose judicially. 
The right to reinstate the note existed regardless of whether 
5 
the note had been accelerated. A 1985 amendment to Section 57-
1-31 arguably extinguished the debtor's right to cure. It was 
error for the lower court to apply the amended statute to this 
case because its retroactive application violates Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-3 and the prohibition against impairment of contracts in 
the State and Federal Constitutions. In addition, the pre-1985 
version of the statute was an implicit part of the contract of 
the parties, and should have been applied to govern any action 
under the contract. 
If the Court nonetheless determines that plaintiff was 
entitled to foreclose, the Order of Sale should be amended. The 
Order of Sale can be read as directing the sale of personal 
property owned by the original debtor (Sherwood Associates) , 
plus that added to the premises by the Tanner defendants. There 
was no allegation in the complaint, and no basis in the con-
tract, for an order for the sale of the personal property added 
by the Tanner defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRE-1985 VERSION OF SECTION 57-1-31 
APPLIED TO GIVE DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO CURE ANY 
DEFAULT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE FORECLOSURE SALE. 
A. The 1985 Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 Do Not 
Apply Retrospectively. 
At issue in this appeal is whether the 1985 amendments to 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 apply to trust deeds executed or 
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guaranteed before 1985, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 provided, 
prior to the 1985 amendment, in pertinent part as follows: 
Whenever all or a portion of the 
principal sum of any obligation secured by a 
trust deed has, prior to the maturity date 
fixed in such obligation, become due or been 
declared due by reason of a breach or 
default in the performance of any obligation 
secured by the trust deed, • . . the trustor 
or his successor in interest . . . or any 
other person having a subordinate lien or 
encumbrance of record thereon . . . , at any 
time within three months of the filing for 
record of notice of default under such trust 
deed, if the power of sale is to be exer-
cised, or, otherwise at any time' prior to 
the entry of the decree of foreclosure, may 
pay to the beneficiary or his successor in 
interest the entire amount then due under 
the terms of such trust deed . . . other 
than such portion of the principal as would 
not then be due had no default occurred, and 
thereby cure the default theretofore 
existing and, thereupon, all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be 
dismissed or discontinued and the obligation 
and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall 
be and remain in force and effect as if no 
such acceleration had occurred. 
(Emphasis added.) The 1985 amendment deleted the underlined 
phrase and made other minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
This statute, as in effect at the time the Trust Deed was 
guaranteed by Darrell Tanner, clearly provided that the trustor 
had the substantive right to reinstate the Trust Deed at any 
time prior to the entry of a decree of foreclosure. The 
district court erred when it gave retrospective effect to the 
amended version of Section 57-1-31 for the following reasons: 
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1. There is no evidence that the legislature intended the 
1985 amendment to apply retroactively. See subpoint I.B. 
below at page 8. 
2. The court's retrospective application of the law 
impairs a substantive provision of an existing contract in 
violation of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, Section 18. See 
subpoint I.e. below at page 9. 
3. The terms of the contract imply that the parties 
intended pre-amendment foreclosure law to govern in case of 
default. See Point II below at page 12. 
B. Absent Legislative Intent, Statutory Amendments That Alter 
Substantive Law or Affect Vested Rights Can Not Be Applied 
Retrospectively. 
A legislative enactment which alters substantive law or 
affects vested rights will not be read to operate retrospective-
ly unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention. 
Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983), In re J.P. . 
648 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Utah 1982). 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986) states that no statute "is 
retroactive unless expressly so declared." If the legislature 
fails to indicate that an amendment of existing law is retro-
active, the amendment is presumed to affect legal rights. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252, n. 11 (Utah 1988). 
Legislative intent is conspicuously absent from the 1985 
amendment to Section 57-1-31. Therefore, a presumption arises 
that the amendment was not intended to affect trust deeds 
executed before the effective date of the statute. Plaintiff 
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failed to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, it was error for 
the district court to grant Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. 
C. The 1985 Amendment to Section 57-1-31 Affects Substantive 
Rights. 
A statute may apply retrospectively without express 
legislative intent if it affects procedural (or remedial) rather 
than substantive rights. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 
(Utah 1979). Distinguishing the difference between substance 
and form is no easy task. Chief Justice Hughes once wrote: "No 
attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between 
alterations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, 
and those which, under the form of modifying the remedy, impair 
substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own 
circumstances.If Home Building and Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, at 430 (1933) (quoting Von Hoffman v. 
Citv of Quincy. 71 U.S. 535, 553 (1866)). 
The question this court must decide is whether the right to 
cure, as contained in Section 57-1-31 prior to the 1985 amend-
ment, is a substantive right or merely "procedural" or "remedi-
al" in nature. 
This appears to be a case of first impression in Utah, 
however, the court has not hesitated to reverse judgments when 
it was error to give retrospective application to amended 
statutes where the legislature made no provisions for retro-
activity. It is the Tanner defendants' position that these 
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cases demonstrate that the right to cure must be recognized as a 
genuine, substantive right—not a mere "procedural" or "remedi-
al" right. 
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 1987) 
fquoting Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 
(1984)), this court stated that a law "is substantive if it 
'creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties . . . as distinguished from adjective law which pertains 
to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal 
machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made 
effective.'" 
It has also been written that "procedural statutes enacted 
subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not 
only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions 
a well." State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 
998, 1000 (Utah 1982)) (emphasis added). See also Carlucci v. 
Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 
1986). Similarly, if an amendment serves only to clarify or 
amplify existing law, it should not be considered "substantive." 
In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 
P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 1983). 
In the language of the foregoing decisions, statutory 
amendments that are "remedial" or "procedural" generally amplify 
or clarify the existing law rather than create or destroy the 
law as it existed. If the amendment "eliminates" or "destroys" 
10 
a contractual right, then substantive law has been altered and 
retroactive application is improper without express legislative 
consent. Carlucci, at 1337. 
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), this 
court held that a statute eliminating joint and several liabil-
ity could not be applied to a negligence action brought by a 
roller rink patron for injuries occurring before the statute's 
effective date. Since the legislature did not direct that the 
statute should have retroactive effect, the substantive law when 
the cause of action arose governed. 
Other examples of amendments that have been found to affect 
"substantive" law are: Worthinaton and Kimball Construction Co. 
v. C & A Development Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), (amendment 
deleting a requirement that notice of liens be verified by 
oath); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), (amendment 
changing requirement that the state be served notice in "all" 
cases where it may be required to indemnify rather than "only 
if" it may be required to indemnify) ; In re Disconnection of 
Certain Territory From Highland City. 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983), 
(amendment creating new factors that the district court must 
consider in a suit to disconnect territory from a city); Schultz 
v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988), (amendment required filing 
of notice pursuant to Governmental Immunity Act regardless of 
whether the function giving rise to the claim is governmental or 
non-governmental). 
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Chief Justice Hughes stated that the determination of "sub-
stantial11 and "remedial" rights depended on the circumstances of 
each case. Blaisdell, at 430. The circumstances of this case 
are that the Tanner defendants have been denied a right to 
reinstate the Note even though they are ready, willing, and able 
to do so. This right existed when the trust deed was executed 
and when the Tanner defendants obtained their interest in the 
property and guaranteed the Note. The Tanner defendants had 
every right to rely on the law as it existed when they sat down 
and negotiated the agreements now in dispute. 
The 1985 amendment to Section 57-1-31 excised a core 
provision that gave defaulting trustors the right to reinstate 
an accelerated loan if the beneficiary chose to judicially 
foreclose. The 1985 amendment "eliminates" or "destroys" the 
contractual right of the trustor to cure a default. It does not 
merely reduce the trustor's rights under the statute—it 
absolutely extinguishes them. For this reason, and because 
there is no legislative intent stating otherwise, Section 57-1-
31 must not be applied retroactively to trust deeds executed 
before 1985. 
POINT II 
THE PRE-AMENDMENT LAW WAS A PART OF THE CONTRACT 
AS IF EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO AND INCORPORATED THEREIN. 
This court has stated: "[i]t has always been recognized 
that a contract contains, implicitly, the laws existing at the 
time it was completed." Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc v. 
12 
Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978). Beehive 
cited with approval Edwards v. Kearzev, 96 U.S. 595, 24 L.Ed. 
793 (1878), which states: 
It is also the settled doctrine of this 
court, that the laws which subsist at the 
time and place of making of a contract enter 
into and form a part of it, as if they were 
expressly referred to or incorporated in its 
terms. This rule embraces alike those 
[laws] which affect its validity, construc-
tion, discharge, and enforcement. 
Edwards, at 601 (emphasis added) (citing Von Hoffman v. City of 
Quincv, 71 U.S. 535, 553 (1866)). 
In 1983, Section 57-1-31 provided for a right to cure at 
any time before the entry of a decree of foreclosure. There is 
no indication in the Trust Deed or Note that the law at the time 
of foreclosure would govern in case of default. If the parties 
did not contemplate such an arrangement, they must have intended 
to be governed by foreclosure law as it then existed. 
When the Tanner defendants guaranteed the Note they had 
every right to believe that they would have a period before the 
entry of foreclosure in which to cure any past due amounts and 
reinstate the accelerated loan. Because the amended version of 
Section 57-1-31 would deny the appellant this right as bargained 
for in the Note and Trust Deed, application of that statute 
would violate both the intentions of the parties and the 
provisions against impairment of contracts in the Federal and 
State Constitutions. 
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POINT HI 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED UNDER THE CURRENT 
VERSION OF SECTION 57-1-31 TO CURE THE DEFAULTS 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT ELECTED TO PROCEED 
BY JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AT THE TIME TANNER TENDERED 
PAYMENT OF THE DEFAULT. 
Points I and II of this brief establish that the rights of 
the parties were governed by the pre-1985 version of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-31. Even if this Court holds that the 1985 amend-
ments do govern this action, however, the result would be the 
same. 
Plaintiff purported to accelerate the entire unpaid balance 
under the contract by letter dated November 30, 1987, and filed 
its complaint, seeking to foreclose its trust deed as a mortgage 
on December 10, 1987. In the interim, on December 7, 1987, 
Ridge Athletic Club, Inc., made a valid tender of all amounts 
necessary to cure the default under the trust deed. Plaintiff 
responded by claiming that the tender was ineffective because 
the entire unpaid balance was due, not just the amount necessary 
to cure the default. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (both before and after the 1985 
amendments) provides that the trustor under a trust deed has a 
right to cure the default at any time within three months after 
the filing of a notice of default. For contracts governed by 
the 1985 amendments, that right to cure can arguably be extin-
guished by electing to proceed by judicial foreclosure. Such an 
election was not made in the instant case, however, until 
December 10, 1987, the date plaintiff filed its complaint. The 
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November 30, 1987, letter does not contain such an election. It 
does give notice that the plaintiff will proceed to "foreclose" 
if the payment is not made, but the term "foreclose" can just as 
readily be understood to mean a trustee's sale under the deed of 
trust. 
The defendant therefore had the right to cure at all times 
prior to the plaintiff's first clear election to proceed by 
judicial foreclosure, which was on December 10, 1987. The 
written tender by Ridge Athletic Club made on December 7, 1987, 
was rejected. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1987) provides that 
such a rejected tender has the same effect as if Ridge Athletic 
Club had actually paid the amount in default. 
Because the defendants had the right to cure at all times 
prior to December 10, 1987, and because Ridge Athletic Club 
tendered payments of all amounts necessary to cure, the 
defendants were not in default on December 10, 1987, the date 
the complaint was filed. The complaint should have been 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FORECLOSE ON 
ANY EQUIPMENT PLACED ON THE PROPERTY BY 
THE TANNER DEFENDANTS. 
The order of sale entered in this matter directs the 
sheriff to sale the real property in issue and also states the 
following concerning the personal property: 
It is further ordered that the equipment, 
furniture, fixtures, furnishings and other 
property described in said Judgment and 
15 
Decree of Foreclosure and more particulary 
described as follows be sold at public 
auction: 
All machinery, equipment, materi-
al, appliances and fixtures 
installed or placed by Debtor in 
the premises for the generation 
and distribution of air, water, 
heat, electricity, light, fuel or 
refrigeration, or for ventilating 
or air-conditioning purposes, or 
for sanitary or drainage purposes, 
or for the exclusion of vermin or 
insects, or for the removal of 
dust, refuse or garbage, and 
including all awnings, window-
shades, draper [sic] rods and 
brackets, screens, floor cover-
ings, incinerators, carpeting and 
all furniture and fixtures used in 
the operation of the buildings, 
together with all additions to, 
substitutions for, changes, in or 
replacements of the whole or any 
part of any or all of said 
articles of property. 
(the "Personal Property"). 
R. 592-93 (emphasis added). 
The order does not define the term "debtor," and is 
ambiguous as to whether it orders the sale of any property 
placed on the premises by the Tanner defendants. If that term 
is construed to mean Sherwood Associates, then the Tanner 
defendants have no objection to the first portion of the order. 
The emphasized portion of the order, however, purports to 
empower the sheriff to sale any additions to the personal 
property. The Tanner defendants have made substantial additions 
to the personal property subsequent to their purchase of the 
Ridge Athletic Club. 
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To the extent that the Order directs the sale of any 
personal property added by the Tanner defendants, it is im-
proper. First, plaintiff did not seek such relief in its 
complaint. The complaint contained the following allegation: 
49. Under the Security Agreement and 
Financing Statement, the Defendant Sherwood 
Associates pledged as additional security 
for the repayment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by the Note all machinery, 
equipment, material, appliances and fixtures 
then or thereafter installed or placed by 
Sherwood Associates in the Subject Property 
(including all replacements and proceeds 
thereof). 
(R. 12.) 
The prayer for relief with respect to the personal property 
stated as follows: 
3. On Plaintiff's Third Cause of 
Action, that the Court enter a Judgment and 
Decree adjudging that Plaintiff is the 
holder of a perfected security interest in 
all machinery, equipment, material, appli-
ances and fixtures placed or used in or 
about any part of the Subject Property by 
Sherwood Associates, and ordering that said 
personal property be sold by the Sheriff of 
Utah County, State of Utah, to satisfy 
amounts which are found to be due and owing 
Plaintiff from Defendant Sherwood 
Associates. 
R. 17. 
In addition, even if plaintiff had pleaded a claim for the 
sale of the personal property added by the Tanner defendants, 
plaintiff would not have been entitled to that relief. The 
Tanner defendants did not grant plaintiff any security interest 
in that property. Although Darrell Tanner did guarantee the 
obligations of Sherwood Associates under the initial security 
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agreement, none of the Tanner defendants signed any security 
agreement granting plaintiff a security interest in any personal 
property added by the Tanner defendants. Without such a 
signature on a security agreement, no security interest exists. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-203(1)(a) (1980). 
This case should be remanded with directions that the order 
of sale should be clarified to clearly provide that plaintiff is 
entitled to foreclose only the personal property placed on the 
premises by Sherwood Associations, and that plaintiff has no 
security interest in any personal property placed on the 
premises by the Tanner defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the law of foreclosure as it existed prior to the 
1985 amendment, the Tanner defendants had a right to tender past 
due amounts with interest as agreed in the Note until a decree 
of foreclosure was entered. Since the Tanner defendants made a 
valid tender of such amounts on December 7, 1988, the Note was 
not in default when Plaintiff filed its action to foreclose. 
The Tanner defendants are therefore entitled to a reversal 
of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff and an order directing the 
district court to grant appellant's motion for summary judgment 
in its entirety. 
In the alternative, if the Court determines that plaintiff 
is entitled to foreclose, the trial court should be directed to 
amend the Order of Sale to clearly reflect that the only 
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personal property to be sold is that placed on the premises by 
Sherwood Associates. 
DATED this /*?£ day of October, 1989. 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
' ' day of October, 1989. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Cynthia K. Cassell 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (1983, amended 1985) 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obligations secured — 
Reinstatement — Cancellation of recorded notice of default. (Jj Whenever all 
or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, 
prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become due or been declared 
due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation secured 
by the trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any install-
ment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with 
the terms of [saefe] the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance2 or 
advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms of such obligation or 
of such trust deed, the trustor or his successor in interest in the trust property 
or any part thereof or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance 
of record thereon or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time 
within three months of the filing for record of notice of default under such trust 
deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, [of; otherwise at asy &me prier te 
the entry ef the decree of foreclosure,] may pay to the beneficiary or his successor 
in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of such trust deed [aad 
the obligation secured thereby] (including costs and expenses actually incurred in 
enforcing the terms of such obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attor-
ney's fees actually incurred) other than such portion of the principal as would not 
then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore exist-
ing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed 
or discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be 
and remain in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner [herein-
above] provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand 
of any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to him 
a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the 
recorded notice of default under such trust deed; and any beneficiary under a trust 
deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such demand, refuses to 
request the trustee to execute and deliver such cancellation [shall be] is liable to 
the person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from such refusal. 
A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the exe-
cution of a trustee's deed [shall constitute] constitutes a cancellation of a notice 
of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust 
deed [skatt] is, when acknowledged, [be] entitled to be recorded and [shall be] ]s 
sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record , 
19 , and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry No. , 
County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed 
by as trustor, in which is named as beneficiary and 
as trustee, and filed for record , 19 , and recorded in Book , 
Page , Records of County, (or filed of record , 19 , 
with recorder's entry No. , County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee _ 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13; 1967, ch. 
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-31 (1988) 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obliga-
tions secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation of 
recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assess-
ments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in accor-
dance with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the trustor or his 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months 
of the filing for record of notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest 
the entire amount then due under the terms of such trust deed (including 
costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, 
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other 
than such portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default 
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all 
proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued 
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain 
in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner 
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand 
of any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to 
him a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancella-
tion of the recorded notice of default under such trust deed; and any benefi-
ciary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after 
such demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver such can-
cellation is liable to the person entitled to such request for all damages result-
ing from such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or 
beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancella-
tion of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of 
default under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and 
is sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following 
form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
, 19 , and record in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry 
No , County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the 
trust deed executed by as trustor, in which is named as 
beneficiary and as trustee, and filed for record , 19 , 
and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry No. 
, County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13; 1967, ch. 
APPENDIX "C" 
Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rent 
...BEIIJ.LI0M..MQRIGASE..LOM..CO.,....'. 
...P.,.Q,...B0O5Z.4.9. 
. . .SALI..LAKE;..CIT.Y.,. .U.BII. .0.4.1.1.5 
CO 
Space Above This Lii 
50572 ^ 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this 2.4.fch.... day of ....DECEMBER 
between SJIMQ9.9..ASSOCIATES, A U 
0 2 CTJ 
or: £n 
FW^RUcorfiBr' 
o 
O 
Pig* 
s >Usi 
H P ' 
<\ 19.7.9. 
O 
whoso address is ..4303 North..Foothill..Drive., Provo.,.. 
(Street AIMI numlwr) (City) 
, as TRUSTOR, 
Utah 
(Stnte) 
..§IEWART.XITLE„GyA , as TRUSTEE,* and 
B E T T I J ^ , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO, TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in .MT.AH 
County, State of Utah: 
:; Commencing at a point which is SOUTH 79.94 feet and WEST 980.57 feet from the Northeast 
•V Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 68° 25* East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57' East 160.00 feet; thence South 81° 31' 
\. v52" East 102.97 feet; thence along the arc of a 766.41 foot radius curve to the right 
* 168.13 feet , the chord of which bears North 27° 17' 05" West 167.80 feet; thence along the 
which bears North 
along the arc of a 
the chord of which bears North 43 45* 
tw,arc of a 286.93 foot radi us curve to the le f t 137.72 feet, the chord of 
; thence North.48° 30' West 178.86 feet; thence 
re 
£34° 45' West 136.40 feet 
"1002.77 foot radius curve to the right 166.26 feet, 
West 166.08 feet; thence North 39° 00' West 250.32 feet; thence along the arc of a 2628.32 
foot radius curve to the right 49.55 feet, the chord of which bears North 38 27' 34" West 
49.55 feet; thence South 52° 04' 48" West 362.79 feet;thence South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 
feet; thence South 20° 24' 30" West 98.88 feet; thence South 65° 06' 39" East 39.08 feet; 
thence South 35° 52' 55" East 41.26 feet; thence South 70° 42' 19" East 53.96 feet; thence 
South 55° 05" 10" East 54.25 feet; thence South 25° 31' 15" West 179.58 feet; thence South 
24° 17» 45" East 58.84 feet; thence South 64° 06' 15" East 48.30 feet; thence North 50° 17' 
13"East 158.78 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.788 acres. 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A) , A Utah Partnership. 
£ Commencing at a point which is North 425.65 feet and West 895.81 feet from the Northeast 
rL Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
> North 24 59' 48" West 158.00 feet; thence South 65° 00' 12" West 113.00 feet; thence South 
> 24° 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence North 65° 00' 12" East 113.00 feet the point of beginning. 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
' Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, casements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed wilh said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
. FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $....1.,20Q ,QQ.Q,.Q0.r...-..-...-, made by 
Trustor, payable to (he order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof: (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTK: Trustee must bo a member of the Utah Slate f$ar: a hank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah: n corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company uulhorizcd to do such business in Utah. 
00 
O 
W 
ro I'ROITCT THE SECURITY ov 'i HIS TRUST ni:i,o, TRUSTOR AGREES 
Page Two 
1 To keep siid property in pood condition and repair not to remove or demolish any building thereon, to 
complete or rtstore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, . 
dunngid or dislrowd Ihcrum, to comply Willi all laws, covenants and reslriclions aflee ling said properly; not 
to commit or pc runt waste then of not to commit stillir or pc rnut any act upon said property in violation of law, to > 
do all other a« ts which from the charictcr or use of said property may bo reasonably necessary, the specific 
e numerations hi re m not « \c hiding the m in r.il, and if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being ob-
t mud for (he put pose of financing construction of improvements on sat I property, Trustor further agrees 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion 
in accordance with plans and S|M oficattons satisfactory to Beneficiary and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all tunes during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as (true and conclusive all facts and state-
ments therein, atui to act thereon hereunder 
2 To provi le and maintain insurance of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or heicatte r erected or plued on said property Such insurance shall bo carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor ol and in form acceptable to Benehciary. 
Jn event of loss, l i usl.tr shall give mime eh ite notice to Benehciary, who mnv make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary 
mstcMcl of to Trustor and Rcncfieniy jointly nnd the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby BCCHred or to the restoration or repair of 
the property damaged 
3 To deliver to, pay for an I maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary m ly require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto 
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee, and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appeir in or defc n I any such action or proceeding, to pay ail costs and expenses, including cost of evi- ' 
dunce of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
5 To pay at least 10 da>s before delinquency all taxes nnd assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water comp my stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said pioperty, to pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges, nn 1 liens with interest, 
on said pioperty or any pait thereof, which at any time appear to IK? prior or superior hereto, to pay nil costs, 
fees, and expenses of this Trust 
G Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon '1 ruslor nnd without releasing 
'1 rustor from an\ obligation hereof may Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the scctuity hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authon/cd to enter upon said 
property for such purposes, commence, appear in nn 1 defend any action or pioceedmg purporting to nffect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee, pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lieu which in the pidginc nt of cither appears to be prior or supern»r hereto, and in ex-
ercising any such powers incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute* discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees 
7 To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest Irom date of expenditure .it the late of ban per cent Ih&i) per annum until paid, nnd the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby e i g h t e e n p e r c e n t (18%) o r h i g h e s t r a t e p e r m i s s i b l e , ^ / 7 
under the laws of the State of Utah. l$M , 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT A * / ^ . 
8 Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation procce ling, or cl image d by fne, or earthquake, or m any other mnnncr. Beneficiary shall bo 
entitled to all compeus.ition awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall he entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement in connection with such taking or damage All such compensation, awardsf damages, rights 
of action and proceeds including the proceeds of .my policies of fire and ollwr insurance affecting said property, 
are he n by assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness seemed hereby Tiustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require 
9 At any time and from time to time upon writ!ten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees nnd pre-
sentation of this Tiust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation nn-l 
retention), without affecting the liability of any |>erson for the payment of the* inch bte«loess secured hereby. 
Trustee may (.0 consent to the making of any map or plat of said property, (b) join in granting any ease 
me nt or creating any restriction thereon, (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof, (dl rccomey, without warranty, all or any part of said property The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described .is the person or persons entitled thereto", nnd the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall bo conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph 
10 As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents issues, royalties an I profits of the properly affected bv this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon Until Tiustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all sueh rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to delimit as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustors right to collect any of such moneys shall cense and Benehciary shall have the* right, with or without 
taking possession of the properly affee le «l hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from tunc* to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enfoicenunl by Beneficiary of thu rif,ht power and authority to collect the same 
Nothing contained herein nor the exercise of the ricjit by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to 
be an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor on assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option 
11 Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may nt any time without notice*, cither in 
ficrson by agent or by a receiver to be appointed by a court ('I rustor hereby consenting to the» appointment of lencfic i iry as sueh receiver), an I without regard to the adequacy of any fertility for the indebtedness hereby 
secured inter upon ind like possession of said properly or any part thereof in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said re nls issues, and profits, including those past duo and unpaid and apply the same less 
costs ,\iui expenses of operation and collection, including leasonabie attorneys fees, upon any inJeblcdncss 
secured hereby, and in sueh order ns Benehciary may determine 
12 The entering upon nnd taking possession of said properly, the collecton of such rents, issues, nnd 
profits or the proe ci els of fue and other insurance policies or compensation or nwards for any taking or 
d image of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice 
13 The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constituto a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
1J Time is of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder nil sums secure 1 hereby shall immediately become due 
and pn)able at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situ ited Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby 
SJIERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited Partnership 
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15. Trustors agree to provide and maintain the following insurance coverage written with \* 
companies having a Best's rating of Af or A with mortgagee clauses in favor of the Beneficiary. 
1) Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance for the full insurable value. V 
2) Public Liability Insurance in amount and terms acceptable to Beneficiary. *V. 
3) Business Interuption Insurance in the amount of $533,000.00. 
4) Other required insurance. C* 
5) All policies shall be kept in force by the Borrower for the life of the loan and jy-
shall be held as directed by Beneficiary.
 # £• 
16. Trustor agrees that upon demand of the Beneficiary, Trustor will pay to Beneficiary on, 
the first day of each month until the note secured hereby is fully paid, together with and r 
in addition to the monthly payments of principal and interest set forth in the Trust Deed Note; 
(a) An installment of the taxes and assessments levied or to be levied against said property, 
and an installment of the premium or premiums that will become due and payable to renew the 
insurance on the improvements on said property. Such installment, shall be equal, respectively, 
to the estimated premium or'premiums for such insurance and taxes and assessments next due 
(as estimated by Beneficiary) less all installments already paid therefore, divided by the 
number of months that are to elapse before one month prior to the date when such premium or 
premiums and taxes and assessments will become due. The Beneficiary shall use such monthly 
payments to-the extent:that they will suffice to pay such premium or premiums and taxes and 
assessments when due. Beneficiary or its Assignee will not'pay Trustor interest with respect tc 
the funds held, as outlined above. 
(b) All monthly payments mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a) of Paragraph 16, 
and all payments to be made under the Trust Deed Note securred hereby shall be added together 
and the aggregate amount thereof shall be paid by Trustor each month on the date specified in 
said Trust Deed Note for the payment of monthly installments in a single payment to be allocated 
by Beneficiary to the following items in the order set forth: 
•
 :
 i Taxes, assessments, insurance premiums; 
:
 ii Interest on the indebtedness secured hereby; 
iii Amortization of the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby. 
Any deficiency in the amount of any such aggregate monthly payment shall constitute an event 
of default under this Trust Deed. • • 
If the total of the payments made by Trustor under (a) hereof shall exceed the amount of pay-
ments' actually made by Beneficiary for taxes and assessmentsi or insurance premium, as the case 
may be, such excess, at the election of Beneficiary, shall be credited on subsequent payments 
to be made by Trustor for such5items,. If there shall be;a default under any of the provisions 
of this Trust Deed'resulting in a sale of the property covered hereby, or if Beneficiary 
acquires said property otherwise after default, Beneficiary may apply, at the time of the com-
mencement of:such proceedings, or at the time said property is otherwise acquired, the amount 
then'remaining to the credit of Trustor under (a) thereof, as a credit on the interest accrued 
on the note to said date, and the balance, if any, in reduction of the principal amount of 
said indebtedness. 
17. Trustor agrees to supply Beneficiary a certified annual operation statement for the sub-
ject property and copies of Sherwood Associates audited annual statements within ninety (90) 
days after the close of each calendar or fiscal year during the term of this mortgage. -
Said statement shall contain at least the following information: 
• A. Current Rent Roll, Tenant Roster : E. Federal & State Income Tax 
B. Gross Rental Income F. Operating Expenses in Reasonable Detail 
C. Other Income and Source G. Depreciation Deduction (for Federal Income Tax 
D. Real Estate Taxes H. Insurance purposes) 
The statements are to be prepared by a C.P.A. in good standing. 
18. Upon the occurence of any of the following events, the Beneficiary will have the right 
to call the loan and make demand for payment of the unpaid principal and interest balance in 
full, including Prepayment penalty as outlined in Paragraph 25. 
(a) Failure of Trustors to furnish annual operation statements as provided in Paragraph 16. 
Insolvency or business failure or the appointment of a permanent Receiver for any of the 
Trustors or appointment of a Receiver for the property or an assignment for the benefit of cre-
ditors, by, or the filing of a.petition under bankruptcy, receivership, insolvency or debtor 
relief or the pendency of any such petition undismissed for a period of 30-days against any 
endorser or guarantor hereof or any person now or hereafter liable, absolutely or contingently 
for the payment of the whole or a part of this mortgage; (b) or in the event the described pro-
perty shall be sold or if any person shall gain an interest in the property by deed, contract 
or other conveyance without prior written consent of Beneficiary, or by operation of law. 
(over) 
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19. EMINENT DOMAIN: 
The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection 
with any condemnation of or injury to the property, or part thereof, or for conveyances 
in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall be paid to the Beneficiary. 
20. Trustor agrees that in the event any of the subject property is sold during the term of 
this Trust Deed, without the prior written approval of the Beneficiary, the Beneficiary rese 
the right to either call the loan or approve the purchaser as a satisfactory purchaser or 
trustor. Trustor agrees that no secondary financing is permitted on the secured property 
without the prior written approval of the Beneficiary. Approval or disapproval of the above 
shall not be unreasonably withheld by the Beneficiary. 
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 
It is agreed that if any part of said premises is of a nature so that the security -
interest therein can be perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code, at adopted and in effec 
from time to time in Utah, this instrument shall constitute a Security Agreement and Trustor 
agrees to join with the Beneficiary in the execution of any financing statement and to execul 
any other instruments that may be required for the perfection or renewal of such security int 
est under said Uniform Commercial Code. '• -
22. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND PROFITS: - - , 
As additional security and collateral for the indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed,- trustc 
agrees to the terms and conditions of the Assignment of Rents and Profits of even date execul 
ed by the trustor covering the subject property. 
23. That as additional and collateral security for the payment of the indebtedness,-Trustor 
hereby assigns to Beneficiary all of the bonus, rents, royalties, rights and benefits accru-
ing under all oil, gas or mineral leases on said property, or which may hereafter be placed 
thereon, including all water and riparian rights, and the lessee or assignee or sublessee is 
hereby directed upon production by the holder of the indebtedness secured hereby of a certif-
ied copy thereof, to pay said bonus, rents, royalties,-rights, and benefits to the owner of 
said debt; this provision to become effective, however, only upon secured, such direction to 
terminate and become null and void upon payment of the indebtedness hereby secured. Any amou 
received by Beneficiary under this provision shall be applied to the reduction of indebtednes 
secured hereby. - - -
24. The Trustors hereby waive any and all rights of redemption from sale under any order or 
decree of foreclosure of this Trust Deed on its behalf and on behalf of each and eyery person 
except decree or judgment creditors of the Trustors,* acquiring any Interest in or title to thi 
premises subsequent to the date of this Trust Deed. Trustor hereby waives any and all redemp 
tion rights in the event of Foreclosure. 
25. PREPAYMENT PRIVILEGE: 
The loan will be closed to prepayment for the first ten years. Thereafter the Borrower will 
be permitted to prepay the loan in full at 105%, decreasing 1/2 of 1% per year to a minimum 
of 101%. Loan year means any twelve-month period commencing on the first principal and in-
terest installment date, and on every yearly anniversary thereafter. 
Payment during foreclosure will constitute a prepayment* Such payments, to the extent perm-
itted by law, will therefore include the premium required under the prepayment, a premium of 
11.5 per cent of the principal balance outstanding, shall be due and payable. In the event 
a tender of payment of the amount necessary to satisfy the entire Indebtedness evidenced by 
the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed is made at any time prior to the sale under foreclosure of 
the Trust Deed, it will constitute an evasion of the prepayment terms and be deemed to be a 
voluntary prepayment. 
26. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordatiori of 
said notice of default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given at then 
required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and 
at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in seperate 
parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor 
to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful 
money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for 
any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until 1t shall be complet-
ed and, in eyery case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof 
by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is 
postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice 
thereof shall be given in the same manner'as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall 
execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without 
By 
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any covenant or warranty, express or implied, m e recitals 1n the Deed of any matters or 
facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Benefic-
iary may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) 
the costs and expenses of exercising the power of, sale and of the sale, including the pay-
ment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in 
connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under 
the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued Interest at 18% per annum or highest rate 
permissible under the laws of the State of Utah from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums 
then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled 
thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with 
the County in which the sale took place. 
27. Upon the occurance of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare 
all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary 
shall be entitled to recover in such proceesing all costs and expenses incident thereto 
including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed b> the court. 
28. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the 
office of the County Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof 
is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, 
the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee 
named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided 
by law. 
29. This Trust Deed shall apply to^ inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, 
their heirs, legatees, devisees, administators, executors, successors and assigns. All obli-
gations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the 
owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, when-
ever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the 
singular number includes the plural. 
30. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made 
a public record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of 
pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action of proceeding in which Trustor, 
Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
31. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
32. The undersigned Trustor request that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice 
of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited Partnership 
BYr 
DAVID R. STEWART, General Partner WAYNE E. PEARCE, General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
; SS • 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
On the ^ MER5#4"j^qf December , 1979, personally appeared before me DAVID R. STEWART, who 
k ^ ^ . ' t ^ ^ , , , , ^ ^ ^ AAA e*„ +v^* u~ -|S a General Partner of SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah 
ing instrument was signed 1n behalf of said Partner-
...
 r v. _ , 3rirty-;of^ j'ts articles of Partnership, and said DAVID R. STEWART, acknowledged to 
me that'^aid PaHhers&ip executed the same. 
My cornini Ss,1 oh Wfcpi res.? • 
V ^ / y s / s a j y V ~m^ Public residing at: 
y^"J^;$* Hnyt s. Wimpr. Bountiful, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:-ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the ..^4-tte^.d.ay of December , 1979, personally appeared before me WAYNE E. PEARCE, who 
being::'-byrini^ ftUtii'>i;'sworn did say that he is a General-Partner of SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah 
Limiteclt 1?4rtn^ r^ JhfT|Jji and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said Partner-
sh ip^ , - iuthor'fiy^f; i ts articles of Partnership, and said WAYNJ^IPEARCE, acknowledged to 
me -that^sj1)J^ParlTier?hip executed the same.
 ; g - - ^ ^ ^ 
MyXpmtsstyn ekpires: / V W J VYZtm^^} ^ 
V r* r,V u [Kk,«w*r: Notary Public residing at: QQ 
fjtT'o^.y Hoyt S. Wimer, Bountiful, Utah « 
50572 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness-secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums Owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mcnfioncd, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together'with tiic said Trust Deed, and to rcconvcy, without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
D a t c d 19..j.?Z/ WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Bys 
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APPENDIX "D" 
L e t t e r , dated November 30, 1987 
S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
«400 FIRST FEDERAL PLAZA E. CRAIG 5MAY 
OF COUNSEL 
3 0 5 EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8-4102 
(SOD 3 5 9 - 4 I O O 
November 30, 1987 
Sherwood Associates 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Re: Washington National- Insurance Co. v. Sherwood 
Associates 
Gentlemen: 
This is to advise that we are counsel for Washington 
National Insurance Company, the assignee of a certain Trust Deed 
Note executed by Sherwood Associates, a Utah limited partnership 
in favor of Bettilj^ on Mortgage Loan Co. dated December 24, 1979, 
in the principal sum of $1,200,000,00. The loan evidenced by the 
Trust Deed Note was secured in part by a Trust Deed with 
Assignment of Rents dated December 24, 1979, (hereinafter the 
"Trust Deed11) which covers certain real property and improvements 
described therein and situated in Utah County, State of Utah. 
This is to further advise that the loan evidenced by the 
Trust Deed Note is in default and the principal amount thereof is 
$1,024,797.87, together with interest thereon to November 1, 
1987, in the sum of $68,746.86, and applicable late charges in 
the sum of $9,984.00. It further appears that the property taxes 
on the real property described in the Trust Deed are delinquent 
and various mechanics and materialmens liens have been filed 
against the property. 
This is to therefore advise that pursuant to Paragraph 27. 
of the Trust Deed and Paragraph 2. of the Trust Deed Note, 
Washington National Insurance Company hereby declares all sums 
secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable. Unless 
the total sum of $1,103,528.73, together with interest at the per 
diem rate of $327.37 from November 1, 1987, is received in the 
office of the undersigned on or before Monday, December 7, 1987, 
at 5:00 p.m., action will be commenced to collect the total sum 
due and owing, to foreclose the Trust Deed, to appoint a Receiver 
CLARK W. S E S S I O N S 
ROY 3. MOORE. P C . 
JOHN F. CLARK 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
OEAN C. ANOREASEN 
DOUGLAS J . PAYNE 
J O H N K. WEST 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Sherwood Associates 
November 30, 1987 
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over the subject property and to otherwise protect the interest 
of Washington National Insurance Company as by law provided 
together with costs and attorneys' fees. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
Yours truly, 
SESS>G1?S & MOORE 
/ 
Clark W. Sessions 
CWS/mc 
cc: Guarantors and General Partners as per attached 
George V. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Olive Davis Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Allan R. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Suzanna P. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Merrill D. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mary C. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
M. Wayne Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Kathlyn L. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo,.Utah 84604 
Donald C. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Debra A. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Jay W. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Olive Marie Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
David R. Stewart, General Partner & Guarantor 
Sherwood Associates, 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Durinda A. Stewart,.Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Wayne E. Pearce, General Partner & Guarantor 
Sherwood Associates, 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Carol Pearce, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
APPENDIX "E" 
Tender, dated December 7, 1987 
RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC. 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, UT 84604 
224-6969 
B^ BUWE 
u£C-8BHT 
'-••*"$&£«i*t.?,M: 
TENDER 
TO: Washington National Insurance Co. 
c/o Clark W. Sessions 
505 East 200 South #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Tender is hereby made to Washington National Insurance Co., hereinafter 
referred to as "WNI" of One Hundred Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred and no/100 
Dollars ($119,200.00) the amount the undersigned calculates to be due under that 
certain note, executed by Sherwood Associates, a Ltd. Partnership, secured by Trust 
Deed dated December 24, 1979. Notwithstanding the specific sum tendered, the 
undersigned tenders the entire delinquency due under said note upon presentation of 
satisfactory proof demonstrating the calculation of such indebtedness. 
This tender is made pursuant to U.C.A. §78-27-1 et. seq. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 1987. 
RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC. 
DARRELL TANNER, President 
APPENDIX "F" 
Let ter , dated December 8, 1987 
S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
CLARK W SESSIONS * 0 0 r'RST ^SDERAL PLAZA £ CRAIG SMAY 
ROY B MOORE PC OF COUNSEL 
JOHN F CLARK SOS EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
DEAN C ANOREASEN SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8*102 
DOUGLAS J PAYNE , . « . » „ . « . , ,«« 
JOHN K WEST < a 0 , } " • - • O O 
December 8, 1987 
Darrell Tanner, President 
Ridge Athletic Club, Inc. 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Re: Sherwood Associates 
Dear Mr. Tanner: 
We received today your letter dated December 7, 1987, in 
which you tender the amount of $119,200.00 or in the alternative 
"the entire delinquency due under said note . . .". Pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §73-27-3, Washington National Insurance 
Company hereby objects to your tender on the following grounds: 
1. Pursuant to the terms of the subject Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed and our letter to you dated November 29, 1987, the 
entire unpaid principal balance and accrued interest together 
with all amounts secured and due under the Trust Deed were 
accelerated on November 30, 1987, and were and are now due and 
payable. 
2. The specific amounts due and payable are as follows: 
a. Unpaid principal balance as 
of November 1, 1987 $1,024,797.87 
b. Unpaid accrued interest as 
of November 1, 1987 68,746.86 
c. Unpaid accrued interest for 
November, 1987 9,820.98 
d. Late Charges 11,520.00 
e. Unpaid accrued interest for 
December 1-8, 1987, at 18Z 
(per diem rate of $512.40) 4,099.19 
TOTAL DUE $1,118,984.90 
S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
Darrell Tanner, President 
December 8, 1987 
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3. Eased upon past performance and various promises made 
in connection with the subject loan as evidenced by the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, it is highly doubtful that performance 
pursuant to the tender would be accomplished. Representations 
have been made to the undersigned concerning various avenues of 
funding, letters of credit, etc. since September and as recently 
as yesterday. All to no avail. 
On behalf of our client Washington National Insurance 
Company, the action previously described in our letter dated 
November 29, 1987, will be taken and pursued. 
Yours truly, 
CWS/mc 
cc: James W. Craig, 
Washington National Insurance Company 
APPENDIX "G" 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
sp 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership; 
WAYNE E. PEARCE, individually, 
and as general partner of 
Sherwood Associates; 
DAVID R. STEWART, individually, 
and as general partner 
of Sherwood Associates; 
OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT 
TRUST, a Utah partnership; 
GEORGE V. OSMOND, individually, 
and as Trustee of Osmond 
Brothers Investment Trust; 
OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND, 
individually, and as Trustee 
of Osmond Brothers Investment 
Trust; ALLAN R. OSMOND and 
SUZANNA P. OSMOND, individuals, 
MERRILL D. OSMOND and MARY 
C. OSMOND, individuals; 
M. WAYNE OSMOND and KATHRYN 
L. OSMOND, individuals; 
DONALD C. OSMOND and DEBRA 
A. OSMOND, individuals; 
JAY W. OSMOND, an individual; 
OLIVE MARIE OSMOND, aka 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE, 
OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. CV872702 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
MARIE OSMOND, an individual; : 
OSMOND STUDIOS, a Utah : 
partnership; DURINDA A. : 
STEWART, an individual; : 
CAROL PEARCE, an individual; : 
THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., : 
a Utah corporation; HOLLADAY : 
BANK & TRUST, a Utah : 
corporation; IFG LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Minnesota : 
corporation; MOORE LEASING : 
COMPANY, fka FMA LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
BOW VALLEY DEVELOPMENT : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
ELIAS MORRIS & SONS COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation; : 
DARRELL D. TANNER, : 
individually, and as Trustee : 
of the Tanner Family Trust; : 
JASON TANNER, an individual; : 
TRACY A. TANNER MCDONALD, an 
individual; LINLEY A. TANNER, : 
an individual; BRADLEY H. : 
TANNER, an individual; : 
THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY, dba : 
GILL COMPANIES, a Texas : 
corporation; BLUNDELL and : 
WEBER, INC., dba UTAH : 
ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Utah : 
corporation; and JOHN DOES : 
1 through 30, : 
Defendants. : 
Based upon the Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on file herein, the Memoranda and exhibits filed by the 
Plaintiff, the amended affidavit of costs and attorney's fees and 
other pleadings on file herein, including the Memorandum Decision 
of the above-entitled Court, it is hereby 
2088-7C.PL2 2 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants Sherwood Associates, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, Wayne E. Pearce, David R. Stewart, Osmond Brothers 
Investment Trust, a Utah partnership, George V. Osmond, George V. 
Osmond as Trustee of Osmond Brothers Investment Trust, Olive Davis 
Osmond, Olive Davis Osmond as Trustee of Osmond Brothers Investment 
Trust, Allan R. Osmond, Suzanna p. Osmond, Merrill D. Osmond, Mary 
C. Osmond, M. Wayne Osmond, Kathryn L. Osmond, Donald C. Osmond, 
Debra A. Osmond, Jay W. Osmond, Olive Marie Osmond aka Marie 
Osmond, Durinda A. Stewart, Carol Pearce and Darrell D, Tanner, 
jointly and severally, owe Plaintiff the following amounts: unpaid 
principal on the Promissory Note in the amount of $1,024,797.87 
together with interest thereon in the amount of $274,346.09 through 
April 1, 1989, and accruing thereafter at the per diem rate of 
$512.40, late charges of $768.00, and attorney's fees and costs of 
$ JkL O&O M°° not including fees and costs for preparation of final 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and supporting documents, and 
fees and costs of sale, which fees and costs may be filed by 
affidavit for inclusion in the Deficiency Judgment if a deficiency, 
after sale, exists. 
2. The Plaintiff's lien on the real property and 
improvements thereon that is the subject of this action is prior 
and superior to the interests of all named Defendants to this 
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action, excluding the interest claimed by Holladay Bank & Trust. 
The subject real property affected and encumbered by Plaintiff's 
lien is located at 4303 North Foothill Drive, Provo, Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Commencing at a point which is South 79.94 feet 
and West 980.57 feet from the Northeast Corner 
of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 68° 
25' East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57' East 
160.00 feet; thence South 81° 31' 52" East 
102.97 feet; thence along the arc of a 766.41 
foot radius curve to the right 168.13 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 27" 17' 05" West 
167.80 feet; thence along the arc of a 286.93 
foot radius curve to the left 137.72 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 34° 45' West 136.40 
feet; thence North 48° 30' West. 178.86 feet; 
thence along the arc of a 1002.77 foot radius 
curve to the right 166.26 feet, the chord of 
which bears North 43° 45' West 166.08 feet; 
thence North 39° 00' West 250.32 feet; thence 
along the arc of a 2628.32 foot radius curve 
to the right 49.55 feet, the chord of which 
bears North 38° 27' 34" West 49.55 feet; thence 
South 52° 04' 48" West 362.79 feet; thence 
South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 feet; thence South 
20° 24' 30" West 98.88 feet; thence South 65° 
06' 39" East 39.08 feet; thence South 35° 52' 
55" East 41.26 feet; thence South 70" 42' 19" 
East 53.96 feet; thence South 55° 05' 10" East 
54.25 feet; thence South 25° 31' 15" West 
179.58 feet; thence South 24° 17' 45" East 
58.84 feet; thence South 64° 06' 15" East 48.30 
feet; thence North 50° 17' 13" East 158.78 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.788 acres. 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A), 
a Utah Partnership. 
Commencing at a point which is North 425.65 
feet and West 895.81 feet from the Northeast 
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Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 24° 59' 48M West 158.00 feet; thence 
South 65° 00' 12" West 113.00 feet; thence 
South 24° 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence 
North 65° 00' 12" East 113.00 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
AND LESS the following: 
Commencing at a point located on the West 
Right-of-Way line of Foothill Drive, Provo, 
Utah, said point being North 626.41 feet and 
West 761.02 feet from the Southeast corner of 
Section 18, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
65°00'12" West 207.00 feet; thence North 
24°59'48" West 20.00 feet; thence North 
65°00'12" East 201.978 feet to the West Right-
of-Way line of Foothill Drive; thence South 
39°00'00" East 20.75 feet along said Right-of-
Way line to the point of beginning. 
(the "Subject Property"). 
3. The Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah shall forthwith 
sell the Subject Property pursuant to Rule 69(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as amended, and thereafter file a written 
return to the Court on said sale, and shall apply the proceeds 
thereof in satisfaction of the amounts due under this Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure including costs of sale and interest accruing 
on the principal through the date of sale, and any excess shall be 
applied as the Court shall direct. 
4. All persons having an interest in the Subject Property 
shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of such 
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interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for 
such redemption; that from and after the period of redemption as 
provided by law or agreement, that Defendants and all persons 
claiming by, through or under them be and they are forever barred 
and foreclosed of all right, title and interest in and to the 
Subject Property; and from and after delivery of the Sheriff's Deed 
to the Subject Property, that the purchaser at the Sheriff's Sale 
shall be given possession of the Subject Property. 
5. The Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah shall sell, 
pursuant to Rule 69(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
amended the following described property: 
All machinery, equipment, material, appliances 
and fixtures installed or placed by Debtor in 
the premises for the generation and 
distribution of air, water, heat, electricity, 
light, fuel or refrigeration, or for 
ventilating or air-conditioning purposes, or 
for sanitary or drainage purposes, or for the 
exclusion of vermin or insects, or for the 
removal of dust, refuse or garbage, and 
including all awnings, windowshades, draper 
rods and brackets, screens, floor coverings, 
incinerators, carpeting and all furniture and 
fixtures used in the operation of the 
buildings, together with all additions to, 
substitutions for, changes, in or replacements 
of the whole or any part of any or all of said 
articles of property. 
(the "Personal Property"). 
6. The Sheriff of Utah County, Stcite of Utah shall apply 
the proceeds of the sale of the Personal Property in satisfaction 
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of this Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and otherwise as set 
forth in paragraph 3 hereof. 
7. In the event that a deficiency results after due and 
proper application of the proceeds of such sale or sales, Plaintiff 
is entitled to a Deficiency Judgment against Defendants, jointly 
and severally, for such sum and amount, including interest on the 
Judgment at the contract rate of 18% per annum. All parties to 
this proceeding and any other person may bid at said Sheriff's Sale 
or sales of the Subject Property and the Personal Property 
described herein. 
DATED this // day of "TV?^ ^ 1989. 
B3 
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APPENDIX "H" 
Order (granting summary judgment 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership; 
WAYNE E. PEARCE, individually, 
and as general partner of 
Sherwood Associates; 
DAVID R. STEWART, individually, 
and as general partner 
of Sherwood Associates; 
OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT 
TRUST, a Utah partnership; 
GEORGE V. OSMOND, individually, 
and as Trustee of Osmond 
Brothers Investment Trust; 
OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND, 
individually, and as Trustee 
of Osmond Brothers Investment 
Trust; ALLAN R. OSMOND and 
SUZANNA P. OSMOND, individuals, 
MERRILL D. OSMOND and MARY 
C. OSMOND, individuals; 
M. WAYNE OSMOND and KATHRYN 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV872702 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
L. OSMOND, individuals; : 
DONALD C. OSMOND and DEBRA : 
A. OSMOND, individuals; 
JAY W. OSMOND, an individual; : 
OLIVE MARIE OSMOND, aka : 
MARIE OSMOND, an individual; : 
OSMOND STUDIOS, a Utah : 
partnership; DURINDA A. : 
STEWART, an individual; : 
CAROL PEARCE, an individual; : 
THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., : 
a Utah corporation; HOLLADAY : 
BANK & TRUST, a Utah : 
corporation; IFG LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Minnesota : 
corporation; MOORE LEASING : 
COMPANY, fka FMA LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
BOW VALLEY DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
ELIAS MORRIS & SONS COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation; : 
DARRELL D. TANNER, : 
individually, and as Trustee : 
of the Tanner Family Trust; : 
JASON TANNER, an individual; : 
TRACY A. TANNER MCDONALD, an : 
individual; LINLEY A. TANNER, : 
an individual; BRADLEY H. : 
TANNER, an individual; : 
THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY, dba : 
GILL COMPANIES, a Texas t 
corporation; BLUNDELL and : 
WEBER, INC., dba UTAH : 
ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Utah : 
corporation; and JOHN DOES : 
1 through 30, : 
: 
Defendants. : 
The Motion of the Plaintiffs for Partial Summary Judgment and 
the Motion of the Defendant Darrell D. Tanner, Jason Tanner, Tracy 
A. Tanner McDonald, Linley A. Tanner, Bradley H. Tanner, Darrell 
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D. Tanner, as Trustee of the Tanner Family Trust, and Ridge 
Athletic Club, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the "Tanner 
Defendants") came on regularly for hearing before the undersigned, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, on the 31st day of 
March, 1989, at 9:00 a.m. The Plaintiff was represented by Clark 
W. Sessions and Cynthia K. Cassell, of Sessions & Moore, and 
Sherman Young, of Ivie & Young, their attorneys. The Tanner 
Defendants were represented by Leslie W. Slaugh of Howard, Lewis 
& Petersen, their attorneys. The Osmond Defendants and Defendants 
David and Durinda Stewart were represented by Douglas M. Whitehead 
of Olsen, Hintze, Nielson & Hill, their attorneys. The Defendants 
Sherwood Associates and Wayne Pearce were represented by Michael 
D. Esplin of Aldrich, Nielson, Weight & Esplin, their attorneys. 
The Defendant Holladay Bank & Trust was represented by Ronald G. 
Russell of Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups, its attorneys. The 
Court heard the arguments and statements of counsel for the 
respective parties, reviewed the files, records, memoranda, 
exhibits and affidavits, including certain depositions on file 
herein, and having taken the matter under advisement and having 
issued its Memorandum Decision on the 6th day of April, 1989, and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the Motion of the Tanner Defendants for Summary 
Judgment be and the same is hereby denied, and 
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2. That the Stipulation of the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Holladay Bank & Trust that the Motion for Summary Judgment of the 
Plaintiff shall apply to all parties other than the Defendant 
Holladay Bank & Trust, be and the same is hereby accepted and 
approved, and, 
3. That the Motion of the Plaintiff for Summary Judgment, 
(by stipulation for Partial Summary Judgment), be and the same is 
hereby granted, the Court specifically finding as follows: 
a. There remains no genuine issue of any material fact 
and the Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment, (by stipulation 
for Partial Summary Judgment), as a matter of law; 
b. When the Defendants went into default under the 
Promissory Note, Deed of Trust and other security agreements, which 
are a part the subject matter of the above-entitled action, the 
Plaintiff had the option of electing a remedy, which the Plaintiff 
elected as that of judicial foreclosure. The Court further finds 
that such remedy included the right of the Plaintiff to accelerate 
the entire debt by declaring the same due and payable which the 
Court finds the Plaintiff did. The Court finds, in addition, that 
because the debt had been accelerated, the tender by the Tanner 
Defendants of a percentage of the accelerated amount of the debt 
due and payable was ineffective and without legal force or effect. 
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c. That the Plaintiff has a valid first lien on the 
property described in the Deed of Trust and is entitled to a 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and an Order of Sale subject to 
the Defendants' rights of redemption as by law provided. 
4. That this Order is final and appealable. 
DATED this J) day of ~JTQI^ , 1989. 
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APPENDIX "I" 
Order of Sale 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL (5050) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah- 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
re 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership; 
WAYNE E. PEARCE, individually, 
and as general partner of 
Sherwood Associates; 
DAVID R. STEWART, individually, 
and as general partner 
of Sherwood Associates; 
OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT 
TRUST, a Utah partnership; 
GEORGE V. OSMOND, individually, 
and as Trustee of Osmond 
Brothers Investment Trust; 
OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND, 
individually, and as Trustee 
of Osmond Brothers Investment 
Trust; ALLAN R. OSMOND and 
SUZANNA P. OSMOND, individuals, 
MERRILL D. OSMOND and MARY 
C. OSMOND, individuals; 
M. WAYNE OSMOND and KATHRYN 
L. OSMOND, individuals; 
DONALD C. OSMOND and DEBRA 
A. OSMOND, individuals; 
JAY W. OSMOND, an individual; 
OLIVE MARIE OSMOND, aka 
ORDER OF SALE 
Civil No. CV872702 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
MARIE OSMOND, an individual; 
OSMOND STUDIOS, a Utah J 
partnership; DURINDA A. : 
STEWART, an individual; : 
CAROL PEARCE, an individual; : 
THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., : 
a Utah corporation; HOLLADAY : 
BANK & TRUST, a Utah : 
corporation; IFG LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Minnesota : 
corporation; MOORE LEASING : 
COMPANY, fka FMA LEASING : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
BOW VALLEY DEVELOPMENT : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; : 
ELIAS MORRIS & SONS COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation; : 
DARRELL D. TANNER, : 
individually, and as Trustee : 
of the Tanner Family Trust; : 
JASON TANNER, an individual; : 
TRACY A. TANNER MCDONALD, an : 
individual; LINLEY A. TANNER, : 
an individual; BRADLEY H. : 
TANNER, an individual; : 
THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY, dba : 
GILL COMPANIES, a Texas : 
corporation; BLUNDELL and : 
WEBER, INC., dba UTAH : 
ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Utah : 
corporation; and JOHN DOES : 
1 through 30, : 
t 
Defendants. : 
TO: THE SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Greetings: 
WHEREAS on the //"y day of May, 1989 Plaintiff obtained a 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in the District Court of Utah 
County, State of Utah against the above-named Defendants which 
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Decree of Foreclosure was duly recorded in and docketed in the 
Clerk's Office, a certified copy of the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated 
herein and made a part hereof. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the real 
property described in said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and 
more particularly described as follows be sold at public auction: 
Commencing at a point which is South 79.94 feet 
and West 980.57 feet from the Northeast Corner 
of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 68° 
25' East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57' East 
160.00 feet; thence South 81° 31' 52" East 
102.97 feet; thence along the arc of a 766.41 
foot radius curve to the right 168.13 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 27° 17' 05" West 
167.80 feet; thence along the arc of a 286.93 
foot radius curve to the left 137.72 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 34° 45' West 136.40 
feet; thence North 48° 30' West 178.86 feet; 
thence along the arc of a 1002.77 foot radius 
curve to the right 166.26 feet, the chord of 
which bears North 43° 45' West 166.08 feet; 
thence North 39° 00' West 250.32 feet; thence 
along the arc of a 2628.32 foot radius curve 
to the right 49.55 feet, the chord of which 
bears North 38° 27' 34" West 49.55 feet; thence 
South 52° 04' 48" West 362.79 feet; thence 
South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 feet; thence South 
20" 24' 30" West 98.88 feet; thence South 65° 
06' 39" East 39.08 feet; thence South 35° 52' 
55" East 41.26 feet; thence South 70° 42' 19" 
East 53.96 feet; thence South 55° 05' 10" East 
54.25 feet; thence South 25° 31' 15" West 
179.58 feet; thence South 24° 17' 45" East 
58.84 feet; thence South 64° 06' 15" East 48.30 
feet; thence North 50° 17' 13" East 158.78 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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Containing 10.788 acres. 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A), 
a Utah Partnership. 
Commencing at a point which is North 425.65 
feet and West 895.81 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 24° 59' 48" West 158.00 feet; thence 
South 65° 00' 12" West 113.00 feet; thence 
South 24° 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence 
North 65° 00' 12" East 113.00 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
AND LESS the following: 
Commencing at a point located on the West 
Right-of-Way line of Foothill Drive, Provo, 
Utah, said point being North 626.41 feet and 
West 761.02 feet from the Southeast corner of 
Section 18, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
65°00'12" West 207.00 feet; thence North 
24°59'48" West 20.00 feet; thence North 
65°00'12" East 201.978 feet to the West Right-
of-way line of Foothill Drive; thence South 
39°00'00" East 20.75 feet along said Right-of-
Way line to the point of beginning. 
(the "Subject Property"). The real property and improvements are 
located at 4303 North Foothill Drive, Provo, Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the equipment, furniture, fixtures, 
furnishings and other property described in said Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure and more particularly described as follows 
be sold at public auction: 
All machinery, equipment, material, appliances 
and fixtures installed or placed by Debtor in 
2088-7B.PL2 
4 
the premises for the generation and 
distribution of air, water, heat, electricity, 
light, fuel or refrigeration, or for 
ventilating or air-conditioning purposes, or 
for sanitary or drainage purposes, or for the 
exclusion of vermin or insects, or for the 
removal of dust, refuse or garbage, and 
including all awnings, windowshades, draper 
rods and brackets, screens, floor coverings, 
incinerators, carpeting and all furniture and 
fixtures used in the operation of the 
buildings, together with all additions to, 
substitutions for, changes, in or replacements 
of the whole or any part of any or all of said 
articles of property. 
(the "Personal Property"). 
NOW THEREFORE, you, the Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah, 
are hereby commanded and required to proceed to notice for sale and 
sell the Subject Property and Personal Property hereinabove 
described and described in said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
and apply the proceeds of said sale as directed in said Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure and you shall make and file your report 
of such sale with the Clerk of this Court within sixty (60) days 
of the date of your receipt thereof and you shall do all things 
according to the terms and requirements of said Judgment and 
2088-7B.PL2 
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Decree of Foreclosure and the applicable provisions and 
requirements of law. 
EXECUTED this / A day of May, 1989. 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
CLERK 
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APPENDIX "J" 
Memorandum Decis ion 
1539 APR - I 1.1 V,' I O 
DP" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
* • * * * * * * * * * * * * • • • • * * * 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, et al. 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2702 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having considered plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment, will grant that motion finding that 
there are no genuine issues as to any material facts. Plaintiff 
has asked that the Court not consider the appointment of a 
receiver at this time. This motion is for partial summary 
judgment because plaintiff has asked that defendant Holladay Bank 
and Trust be excluded from the motion. 
The first issue which the Court will consider is 
whether the defendant's tender was effective. The Court finds 
that it was not. When defendants went into default, under the 
statute governing trust deeds, U.C.A. 57-1-23, plaintiff had the 
option of electing a remedy. The remedy which was chosen was 
judicial foreclosure. A part of this remedy includes 
acceleration of the entire debt making it due and payable. 
Because the debt had already been accelerated, defendants tender 
of a small percentage of the accelerated amount of the debt was 
ineffective. 
l 
After consideration of the oral arguments and memoranda 
concerning this case, the Court finds that the plaintiff has a 
valid first lien on this property which it is entitled to 
foreclose against the defendants. Plaintiffs also have a right 
to bring an action against defendants for any deficiency after 
the sheriff's sale. As admitted by plaintiff's counsel at the 
hearing, defendants have a right of redemption. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare a summary judgment and 
an order of sale incorporating the terms of this decision and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 6th day of April, 1989. 
BY 
cc: Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Richard L. Hill, Esq. 
Michael D. Esplin, Esq. 
C.T. Corporation Systems 
M. HARDING, JUDGE / 
o 
